



The Long Beach Surveillance State: How LBPD's Use of Technology Expands Police Power and Immigration Enforcement

Introduction

Over the past decade, the Long Beach Police Department has steadily expanded its use of surveillance technology, with alarming implications for Black, immigrant, and people of color communities. This technology does not offer a benign alternative to abusive policing; it only expands and accelerates incarceration and deportation in already over-policed communities.ⁱ The LBPD has received \$247 million from Long Beach's \$559 million 2021 General Fund. This equates to 44% of the General Fund, the largest portion out of any other city department. Of LBPD's approximately \$14 million in vendor spending from June 2020 to May 2021, at least \$7,332,631 million was spent on surveillance.ⁱⁱ Instead of providing continued funding, we urge the City Council to end its use of the surveillance technologies discussed below, and to reinvest tax dollars in community priorities.ⁱⁱⁱ

This fact sheet highlights invasive surveillance technology used by the LBPD, including automated license plate readers (ALPRs), cell phone surveillance, and facial recognition. It also explains the harms of this surveillance and recommends limiting law enforcement's acquisition and use of this technology.

Specific Surveillance Technology

1. Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

ALPRs are high-speed cameras that capture license plate information from passing cars. They record the location, date, and time of every capture, and sometimes include images of passengers. In December 2020, the Long Beach Public Works Department signed a \$381,050 contract for 17 new license plate reader cameras.^{iv} This equipment was purchased with the express intent of being interoperable with LBPd's existing ALPR system from Vigilant Solutions, for which LBPd has paid \$622,194 since 2015, meaning that the city has spent at least **\$1,003,244** on the tool.^v The Public Works Department has invested in ALPRs affixed to patrol vehicles for the stated purpose of parking enforcement,^{vi} but City Council documents note that Vigilant Solutions was chosen because it is absolutely necessary that it be compatible with the police department's existing system. Vigilant Solutions offers a nationwide database for police departments to access other agencies' data and Vigilant's own network of private ALPRs. Agencies can share "hot lists", which include the plate numbers for stolen cars or cars that are implicated in ongoing investigations.

ALPRs dramatically increase the scale of police surveillance. From 2018 to 2019, **LBPd scanned over 44 million license plates**, only 0.09% of which matched a car on a hot list.^{vii} Given the racialized deployment of ALPRs, these hot lists are likely to overrepresent Black and Brown people, who then face frequent enforcement^{viii} and traumatizing encounters.^{ix}

With data on the daily travel of every person in Long Beach, the LBPd could create an intimate and invasive account of people's activities. ALPRs enable the police to scrutinize visits to sensitive locations, such as immigration clinics, abortion clinics, and places of worship.^x LBPd was sharing ALPR data directly with ICE for at least 10 months against local law.^{xi} LBPd reportedly claimed in December 2020 that the department had revoked ICE's access to the database,^{xii} but records from April 2021 suggest that LBPd continues to share information with certain divisions of ICE. As of April 6, 2021, Vigilant Solutions reported that LBPd received the "HSI Master" hot list via another police department.^{xiii} HSI, or Homeland Security Investigations, is the division of ICE responsible for executing workplace raids and criminal immigration cases. Furthermore, as of April 2021, LBPd was sharing license plate detection data with the HSI Bulk Cash Smuggling Center, also a division of ICE, as well as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and California's Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC), a Fusion Center with ICE participation.^{xiv} Technology company Palantir developed several applications for JRIC between 2012 and 2014 that allow the Fusion Center to search for ALPR data by location, license plate number, and camera.^{xv} Once license plate data is in the hands of any of these federal immigration agencies, it is easily accessible to other ICE agents.^{xvi}

Perhaps even more alarming, the private contractor that oversees the city's ALPR system is the police department's liaison to the regional Fusion Center, with which LBPd shares license plate data.^{xvii} Fusion Centers are designed to facilitate information sharing between local law enforcement and DHS agencies including ICE. LBPd holds a \$695,000 contract with SRA International (acquired by military contractor General Dynamics in 2018) for the services of three

intelligence analysts, funded by a grant from DHS. LBPB has put SRA International in charge of their Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) system, which has been used to criminalize and track BIPOC and undocumented immigrants.^{xxviii} The three privately contracted intelligence analysts in Long Beach are respectively charged with “criminal intelligence gathering” at the JRIC; “criminal suspect location and identification” at the Gangs and Violent Crimes & Division; and oversight of the city’s LBCOP surveillance camera system,^{xxix} to which the city’s ALPR system feeds images. It is cause for grave concern that the firm that oversees LBPB’s license plate recognition system is the police department’s liaison to the regional DHS-run Fusion Center, with which LBPB shares license plate data, and that the funding for their salary is provided by DHS.

2. Cell Phone Surveillance

Stingrays/Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers^{xxx}: Cell-site simulators make phones within a certain radius connect with the simulator instead of a legitimate cell-phone tower. Depending on the type of cell-site simulator, law enforcement can collect identifiable information, the phone’s precise location, metadata about calls (who and when you’re calling), the content of SMS and voice calls, and data usage.^{xxxi} In 2020, LBPB spent \$35,000 with the Harris Corporation for services on a Stingray (also known as a cell-site simulator or IMSI catcher) that the department purchased in 2013. LBPB has spent approximately \$550,000 since 2013 on this type of surveillance. LBPB used Stingray devices for over two years without any internal rules until SB 174 required all departments with cell-site simulators to create a public policy by 2016. ICE has also purchased many Stingrays and has used them to facilitate arrests.^{xxxi} Cell-site simulators thus provide an avenue for collaboration between local police and immigration authorities. In 2021, LBPB purchase a Jugular 4 Field Kit from KeyW Corporation (owned by the publicly-traded Jacobs Engineering). This is a portable device that complements Stingrays by allowing police to go into a big building to identify which floor and room a target phone is located in, since Stingray devices in cars cannot provide that degree of precision.

Pen Registers: The LBPB continues to work with Pen-Link LTD, a vendor that provides phone and internet surveillance services exclusively to law enforcement. LBPB spent \$24,999 for maintenance work in 2021, and has spent approximately \$360,000 with Pen-Link since 2013. By mapping the phones, email addresses, and computers that communicate or exchange information, police departments can recreate a person’s social network and criminalize them for association with other people under investigation. Pen-Link software is also used by ICE as part of the case management system developed for that agency by Palantir.^{xxiii}

Cell Phone Hacking: In 2021, the LBPB spent \$80,017 for cellphone hacking service from Cellebrite. It has spent some \$380,000 with Cellebrite since 2013. Cellebrite’s hardware and software allow law enforcement to bypass cell phone passcodes and extract private information, as well as deleted information. Recent reporting suggests that security flaws with Cellebrite allow for the manipulation of past datasets and the generation of false data in future extractions.^{xxiv} Law enforcement can use the extensive and highly private information from a phone^{xxv} to create a distorted picture of a person and make the case for deportation. ICE also has a contract with

Cellebrite,^{xxvi} and CBP has been shown to conduct thousands of warrantless phone searches at the border every year, using technology including Cellebrite.^{xxvii}

3. Facial Recognition + Other Biometric Analysis

Facial recognition software is notoriously racist^{xxviii} and prone to abuse^{xxix}, yet local and federal law enforcement agencies, including ICE, have used the technology on images of protests and demonstrations following the killing of George Floyd. LBPd has used facial recognition for over a decade, mainly through participation in the **LA County Regional Identification System (LACRIS)**. LACRIS uses booking photo information provided by county and local jails to conduct biometric identification of faces and fingerprints. ICE, in turn, has a two-way information sharing agreement with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, which operates LACRIS.^{xxx} The company that developed LACRIS, DataWorks Plus, deployed a similar platform with the same underlying algorithms in Detroit, and it produced disastrous results. Detroit's police chief admitted that the platform wrongly identified 96% of uploaded photos, and faulty analyses have led to two wrongful prosecutions of Black men.^{xxxi}

Since 2019, LBPd has used extended free trial versions of **Clearview AI** and **Vigilant Solutions Face Search**.^{xxxii} Free trials are granted for evaluation purposes, but officers often use the software for ongoing investigations, without proper documentation, oversight, or training. LBPd had no official facial recognition policy until a September 2020 department Watch Report.^{xxxiii} The Department has since ended their extended free trials of FaceSearch and Clearview AI software.^{xxxiv} LACRIS remains an authorized facial recognition system for Los Angeles County in spite of DataWorks Plus's sordid reputation.


Recommendations

As part of the ultimate goal of defunding the LBPd, we demand that the Long Beach City Council **end** police department funding for these invasive technologies that create a mass surveillance state and drain money from our city. **The City Council must:**

1. End the use of Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPR): terminate the contract with SRA International/General Dynamics and Vigilant Solutions.
2. End cell phone surveillance: terminate the Stingray contract with Harris Corporation and the cell phone hacking contract with Cellebrite.
3. Prohibit any government use of ALPR, cell phone surveillance, or facial recognition technology, whether in the form of a trial, contract, or purchase of third party data.
4. Remove the LBPd from participation in LACRIS, prohibit direct data sharing with federal immigration authorities, and prohibit indirect data sharing with federal and local authorities and private companies that collaborate with federal immigration authorities.
5. End all other civilian surveillance programs.
6. Prohibit future purchases or use of other surveillance technology.
7. Make public all records of surveillance in use.

Appendices

Appendix A. LBPD Surveillance Spending in 2020*



*Representative of spending through July 2020

**The most invasive technologies are not always the most expensive. For example, LBPD has used facial recognition for years through free trial agreements. It is important to note how much of city dollars fund surveillance, but also the negative community consequences.

Appendix B. List of Surveillance Technology By Vendor

Vendor	Type of Technology Purchased by LBPD in 2020
Axon	Body worn cameras (BWC) and Evidence.com (BWC footage storage cloud)
SRA International Inc.	IT intelligence analysts
Gartner Group Inc.	IT research and strategic consulting services
Harris Corporation	StingRay cell tower (cell phone data interception technology)
Relx Inc.	LexisNexis Accurint subscription (personal information database)
Cellebrite	Locked cell phone data extraction software
LexisNexis Risk Solutions	Data broker
GovDirect LLC	Camera technology for drones, BWC, cars, etc.
Pen-Link LTD	Cell phone tracking and data interception technology
State of California	LiveScan fingerprinting devices
Crime Point Inc.	HermitCam HD Camera (covert video surveillance equipment)
Omega Group Inc.	Geographic information systems software
Open Text LLC	Cloud-based information management software
Datablaze LLC	GPS tracking for vehicles and cell phones
CI Technologies Inc.	IA Pro case management software and BlueTeam field support services app
FirstTwo Inc.	Personal information, location-based visual intelligence software
FinalCover LLC	CaseGuard facial recognition redaction and enhancement software
Callyo 2009 Corp	Cloud-based mobile app that includes virtual investigation phones, tip lines, social media intelligence platforms, and undercover police bugs
Crash Data Group Inc.	Vehicle crash data retrieval platform
TVEyes	TV and radio coverage search engine
3SI Security Systems Inc.	GPS tracking and cash tracing technologies
TransUnion Risk & Alternative Data	Data broker

Appendix C. Summary of Surveillance Contracts Maintained by LBPD

Technology	Company	Contracts
ALPRs	SRA International, Inc.	Almost \$2M spent on technology and services since 2013 and almost \$700,000 spent in 2020.
	Vigilant Solutions	Currently, Public Works has a \$381,050.45 contract for 17 new license plate reader cameras in December of 2020. ^{xxxv} This system will be interoperable with LBPD's existing ALPR system from Vigilant Solutions, for which LBPD has paid 622,194 since 2015. ^{xxxvi}
Cell phone Tracking	Harris Corporation	LBPD has spent over \$550,000 on Harris Corporation technology since 2013.
	Cellebrite ^{xxxvii}	From 2013 to 2020, LBPD has purchased almost \$300,000 worth of Cellebrite services. LBPD spent nearly \$30,000 in 2020 to renew their access to the Cellebrite software, which helps different government agencies extract private digital data from locked cell phones. Additionally, in 2019, Cellebrite was awarded a contract of up to \$35 million with ICE , under which ICE will utilize and obtain "universal forensic extraction devices (UFEDs), accessories licenses, training and support services." ^{xxxviii}
	Pen-Link Ltd. ^{xxxix}	Pen-Link has received an estimated \$334,047 from LBPD since 2014. Pen-Link was awarded \$1 to 2 million , the largest PPP award of all LBPD's vendors. ^{xl}
Biometric Identification & Facial Recognition	Vigilant Solutions & Clearview AI	Vigilant Solutions FaceSearch and Clearview AI have provided free trials to LBPD for facial recognition technology. Clearview AI also has a \$224,000 contract with ICE. ^{xli}
Body-worn Cameras	Axon	Since 2013, the Long Beach Police Department has spent nearly \$3 million on Axon surveillance technology, with nearly \$2 million worth of surveillance technology bought from the company in 2020 alone. LBPD is expected to pay Axon a grand total of over \$4 million by 2023. ^{xlii}
	Los Angeles County Regional Identification System (LACRIS)	Since 2018, the LA Sheriff's Department has run LACRIS through a contract with DataWorks using algorithms from NEC Corporation, a biometric technology company that is interoperable with DHS's biometric identification systems and has also provided technology for ICE. ^{xliii}
	RELX's LexisNexis Accurint Database	LBPD has spent over \$360,000 on RELX services since 2013. In 2020, LBPD spent over \$33,000 to access RELX's LexisNexis Accurint Database .

Writers: Anuj Shah, Divya Babbula, Aaron Lackowski

Appendices A-C created by Ramon Salgado, Julissa Torres, Silvia Enteza

Editors: Julie Mao, Aaron Lackowski

Researchers: Aaron Lackowski, Ramon Salgado, Julissa Torres, Silvia Enteza

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- ⁱ Take Back Tech: How to Expose And Fight Surveillance Tech In Your City, Just Futures Law (July 2019), https://justfutureslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Tech-Policy-Report_v4LNX.pdf; Micol Seigel, Police Abolition or Police Surveillance: The Looming Choice, Social Justice (September 23, 2020), <http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/police-abolition-or-police-surveillance-the-looming-choice/>
- ⁱⁱ Greg Buhl, LBPd Vendor Records 2013-June 2020. https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1GI5hyuGp8j-QMD5OfbeWT0s8TtlbYz0NummOgu_9bFQ/edit?usp=sharing
- ⁱⁱⁱ Long Beach's "progressive" policy prohibits data sharing with ICE for civil immigration enforcement, the implied allowance for data sharing where ICE claims it is conducting criminal enforcement remains concerning, further criminalizing BIPOC communities that are subject to racist policing. See Dave Maass, *California Coalition Calls for Moratorium on State Gang Database*, Electronic Frontier Foundation (June 22, 2020), <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/california-coalition-calls-moratorium-state-gang-database>
- ^{iv} City of Long Beach. Contract No. 35762. <https://citydocs.longbeach.gov/CityContracts/DocView.aspx?id=3790815&dbid=0&repo=Laserfiche-CityofLongBeach&searchid=ec2315cf-2da4-4894-beb0-b060acf8c153&cr=1>
- ^v City of Long Beach purchase data obtained by CheckLBPD.org.. Contract No. 35762. <https://citydocs.longbeach.gov/CityContracts/DocView.aspx?id=3790815&dbid=0&repo=Laserfiche-CityofLongBeach&searchid=ec2315cf-2da4-4894-beb0-b060acf8c153&cr=1>
- ^{vi} Kevin Flores, *City Council to Decide Whether to Buy Controversial License Plate Readers*, FORTHE (November 17, 2020), <https://forthe.org/journalism/license-plate-readers/>
- ^{vii} Dave Maass, *Data Driven 2: California Dragnet—New Data Set Shows Scale of Vehicle Surveillance in the Golden State*, Electronic Frontier Foundation (April 22, 2021), <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/04/data-driven-2-california-dragnet-new-dataset-shows-scale-vehicle-surveillance>
- ^{viii} Rachel S. Fleischer, *Bias in, Bias out: Why Legislation Placing Requirements on the Procurement of Commercialized Facial Recognition Technology Must Be Passed to Protect People of Color*, American Bar Association (December 18, 2020), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_contract_law/publications/public_contract_law_jrnl/50-1/bias-bias-out-why-legislation-placing-requirements-the-procurement-commercialized-facial-recognition-technology/#ref94
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- ^x Dave Maass, *The Four Flavors of Automated License Plate Reader Technology*, Electronic Frontier Foundation (April 6, 2017), <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/04/four-flavors-automated-license-plate-reader-technology>
- ^{xi} Suhana Hussain and Johana Buiyan, *Police in Pasadena, Long Beach pledged not to send license plate data to ICE. They shared it anyway*, Los Angeles Times (December 21, 2020), <https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-12-21/pasadena-long-beach-police-ice-automated-license-plate-reader-data>; Valerie Osier, *After promising not to, LBPd says it accidentally shared license plate data with ICE*, Long Beach Post News (December 21, 2020), <https://lbpost.com/news/immigration/lincense-plate-readers-ice-long-beach-police-share-accident>
- ^{xii} Valerie Osier, "After promising not to, LBPd says it accidentally shared license plate data with ICE," Long Beach Post News, December 21, 2021, <https://lbpost.com/news/immigration/lincense-plate-readers-ice-long-beach-police-share-accident>
- ^{xiii} Stephen Downing. "ACLU Alleges LBPd Use of License Plate Reader Data Illegal." March 22, 2021. <https://beachcomber.news/content/aclu-alleges-lbpd-use-license-plate-reader-data-illegal>
- ^{xiv} Full Values Act compliance requires that the LBPd get assurances of compliance from the 1,000+ agencies it shares data with on the LEARN system. However, as of January 2020, the LBPd shared data with Homeland Security Investigations (a division of ICE), US Customs and Border Protections' National Targeting Center, CA Border Patrol and numerous other federal and local agencies that reportedly share information with ICE (including the La Habra, Upland, Merced and Union City police). See Greg Buhl, *Analyzing LBPd's Use of License Plate Readers*, Beachcomber (Aug. 8, 2020), <https://beachcomber.news/content/analyzing-lbpd-use-license-plate-readers>; Suhana Hussain and Johana Buiyan, *Police in Pasadena, Long Beach pledged not to send license plate data to ICE. They shared it anyway*, Los Angeles Times (December 21, 2020), <https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2020-12-21/pasadena-long-beach-police-ice-automated-license-plate-reader-data>

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- ^{xv} Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, recommendation to approve a retroactive sole source contract with Palantir Technologies, Inc. to provide software maintenance and support services for the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, March 29, 2016.
- ^{xvi} For further information on information sharing between DHS agencies, see: Mijente, *Who's Behind ICE? The Tech and Data Companies Fueling Deportations*, Mijente (Oct 2018), [https://mijente.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/WHO%E2%80%99S-BEHIND-ICE -The-Tech-and-Data-Companies-Fueling-Deportations-v1.pdf](https://mijente.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/WHO%E2%80%99S-BEHIND-ICE-The-Tech-and-Data-Companies-Fueling-Deportations-v1.pdf)
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- ^{xviii} *Id.*
- ^{xix} City of Long Beach. Vendor Selection Form. https://checklbpd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/FY19-FY20-VSF_Redacted.pdf
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- ^{xxi} *Cell-Site Simulators/IMSI Catchers*, Electronic Frontier Foundation, <https://www.eff.org/pages/cell-site-simulatorsimsi-catchers>
- ^{xxii} Adam Schwartz, *No Hunting Undocumented Immigrants with Stingrays*, Electronic Frontier Foundation (May 19, 2017), <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/05/no-hunting-undocumented-immigrants-stingrays>; Alexia Ramirez, *ICE Records Confirm that Immigration Enforcement Agencies are Using Invasive Cell Phone Surveillance Devices*, ACLU (May 27, 2020), <https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/ice-records-confirm-that-immigration-enforcement-agencies-are-using-invasive-cell-phone-surveillance-devices/>
- ^{xxiii} Mijente, *Who's Behind ICE? The Tech and Data Companies Fueling Deportations*, Mijente (Oct 2018), <https://mijente.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/WHO%E2%80%99S-BEHIND-ICE -The-Tech-and-Data-Companies-Fueling-Deportations- v1.pdf>
- ^{xxiv} Michael Kan, *iPhone Hacking Device From Cellebrite Is Rife With Exploitable Flaws, Says Signal*, PCMag (April 21, 2021), <https://www.pcmag.com/news/iphone-hacking-device-from-cellebrite-is-rife-with-exploitable-flaws-says>
- ^{xxv} Jay Stanley, *Mobile-Phone Cloning Tools Need to Be Subject to Oversight — and the Constitution*, ACLU - Free Future (May 16, 2017), <https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/mobile-phone-cloning-tools-need-be-subject-oversight-and>
- ^{xxvi} Blake Montgomery, *ICE Has a New \$30M Contract With Israeli Phone Cracking Company Cellebrite*, The Daily Beast (September 11, 2019), <https://www.thedailybeast.com/ice-has-a-new-dollar30m-contract-with-israeli-phone-cracking-company-cellebrite>
- ^{xxvii} Electronic Privacy Information Center, Letter to U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, July 10, 2018.
- ^{xxviii} Mikael Thalen, *New Study Shows Persistent Racial Bias in Facial Recognition*, Daily Dot (Dec. 20, 2019), <https://www.dailydot.com/irl/facial-recognition-study-racial-bias/>; U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Facial Recognition Technology* (June 3, 2021) <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-518>
- ^{xxix} Shira Ovide, *A Case for Banning Facial Recognition*, The New York Times (June 9, 2020), <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/09/technology/facial-recognition-software.html>
- ^{xxx} DHS Privacy Impact Assessment DHS/ICE/PIA-051, Law Enforcement Information Sharing Service (LEIS Service), June 2019, www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsicepia-051-law-enforcement-information-sharing-service-leis-service.
- ^{xxxi} Stop LAPD Spying, *Open Letter: Reject LAPD Face Recognition*, Knock LA (December 14, 2020), <https://knock-la.com/open-letter-reject-lapd-face-recognition-e970e5ad68b3/>
- ^{xxxii} Vigilant Solutions runs the LBPd ALPR program and created the FaceSearch technology that analyzes millions of faces from mugshot databases uploaded by other local police departments and websites related to criminal justice. Clearview AI is a facial recognition software and search algorithm: the database has images from public social media posts, regular media, personal blog pages, and other websites.
- ^{xxxiii} LBPd Watch Report: Use of Facial Recognition Programs, (Sep. 29, 2020), <https://checklbpd.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Watch-Order-Facial-Recognition.pdf>
- ^{xxxiv} Greg Buhl, *The Surveillance Architecture of Long Beach: A Decade of LBPd Facial Recognition Technology Use with Inadequate Policy, Oversight, and Transparency (Full Report)*, Check LBPd (Nov. 13, 2020), <https://checklbpd.org/facial-recognition-part-one/>

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^{xxxvi} City of Long Beach purchase data obtained by CheckLBPD.org.. Contract No. 35762.

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^{xxxvii} Cellebrite has been subject to different lawsuits, such as the lawsuit from the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) against their “warrantless searches of mobile devices.”# Contracting documents obtained through discovery in this lawsuit revealed Cellebrite’s ability to access information like emails, voicemails, web browsing information, previous locations and more, all from bypassing cell phone passcodes.

^{xxxviii} U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Special Notice No. 192119VHQ4CCC1234.

<https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/ice-notice-of-intent-to-award-contract-to-cellebrite-for-smartphone-hacking-technology/#/tab-policy-documents>

^{xxxix} Pen-Link Ltd. is a small company whose technology is exclusively sold to law enforcement agencies, including ICE, to track cell phones and intercept audio, emails, text messages, and app data. Their funding continues to expand with the help of the Paycheck Protection Program, a government loan created to help small businesses during the COVID-19 Pandemic that has been awarded to many of LBPD’s vendors.

^{xl} Greg Buhl. “The Surveillance Architecture of Long Beach: LBPD Vendors and the Paycheck Protection Program.” Nov 11, 2020. <https://checklbpd.org/the-surveillance-architecture-of-long-beach-lbpd-vendors-and-the-paycheck-protection-program/>

^{xli} Greg Buhl, “The Surveillance Architecture of Long Beach: A Decade of LBPD Facial Recognition Technology Use with Inadequate Policy, Oversight, and Transparency.” Nov 13, 2020. <https://checklbpd.org/facial-recognition-abridged-report/>

^{xlii} City of Long Beach, *Contract No. 34946*,

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