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## In Depth

### Rhode Island Atty Gen'l Releases Report on "LNG Facilities in Urban Areas: Security Risk Mgt. Analysis." Principal Investigator: Richard A. Clarke

(May 17, 2005) -- The Rhode Island Attorney General's office has released a detailed, at times chilling, 150+ page report entitled "LNG Facilities in Urban Areas: A Security Risk Management Analysis."

The report's principal investigator was Richard A. Clarke, former National Security Council counter-terrorism advisor on 9/11/01...whose book (*Against All Enemies*) and 9/11 Commission testimony criticized former administrations and charged the Bush administration failed to take adequate protective measures in the elevated-threat period preceding the 9/11 attacks.

In a written release, Rhode Island Attorney General Patrick Lynch said:

"This is the kind of information that the big-money LNG industry hasn't wanted the public to have since they started putting all of these terminal proposals on the drawing board. I hope that Richard Clarke's threat analysis helps inform the public, both here in Southeastern New England and nationally, about the stupidity and short-sightedness of siting LNG facilities in densely populated urban areas."

Clarke presented the report to RI Attorney General Lynch on May 9 at Brown University. The report states in part:

"If all alternative sites do cost more and governments do proceed with the proposed urban location because of that cost differential, then the cost trade-off can be precisely measured. Governments would be deciding that avoiding the possible additional financial

EXCERPTS FROM RHODE ISLAND ATTORNEY GENERAL REPORT ON

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...CONSEQUENCES: There is a spectrum of expert opinion on the precise extent of damage that would result from various levels of attack on an urban LNG facility and on an LNG tanker. There appears, however, to be a high risk that catastrophic damage could occur if a large breach were made in the urban LNG facility's tank, if three of five containers aboard the LNG tanker were breached, or if an attack occurred involving both the facility and the tanker during unloading.

The consequences of a major attack could include fires that would damage homes, hospitals, a chemical plant, and other infrastructure, depending upon where the attack occurred.

**Many fires could exceed the 2000 BTU limit for the employment of fire fighters, necessitating a "let it burn" approach to many structures. There would be both prompt and delayed fatalities.**

The delayed fatalities and the wounded could place a burden on the Rhode Island and South Eastern Massachusetts trauma, burn, and overall emergency medical response capability that the system would be unable to handle.

...RECOVERY: The financial cost of compensating victims and rebuilding damaged or destroyed facilities following a catastrophic attack on the urban LNG facility and/or LNG tanker would likely exceed any insurance carried by the owners and operators of the LNG facility and tanker.

...HIDDEN COSTS: In the absence of adequate insurance to pay victims and rebuild damaged or destroyed facilities, the LNG operators would be transferring

the financial cost of the risk they would be creating either to the victims or to governments, or to some combination of both. Governments would also bear costs for greatly enhanced security and consequence management, including mass trauma and burn capabilities.

**...RISK JUDGMENT: We judge that terrorist groups now have the intent to attack facilities in the US such as the urban LNG off loading facility proposed. We judge that they could relatively easily both obtain the needed capability and conduct an attack on the urban LNG facility and/or the LNG tanker during its transit..... We judge that such attacks run a high risk of generating catastrophic damage, with which the region could not adequately cope during the consequence management or recovery phases.**

**...RISK REDUCTION AND AVOIDANCE: We doubt that deterrence or prevention measures could be designed and implemented for the proposed facility and ship routing that would be adequate against a determined and skilled terrorist group of the type that exists today.**

NET ASSESSMENT: While there is no adequate way in which to determine the probability of a terrorist attack on the proposed urban LNG facility and inland waterway transit routing, there is adequate grounds to judge that such an attack would be consistent with terrorists demonstrated intent and capability. There is also a basis to judge that likely enhanced security measures would not significantly reduce the risk. While there are some differences among experts about the conditions needed to generate a catastrophic explosion and about the precise extent of the resulting damage, **there is significant grounds to conclude that a high risk exists of catastrophic damage from the types of attacks terrorists are capable of mounting. Those damage levels would overwhelm regional trauma, burn, and emergency medical capabilities.** The LNG facility's insurance is likely to be inadequate to fully compensate victims and to rebuild facilities.