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**Sent:** Monday, June 8, 2020 2:27 PM  
**To:** CityClerk <[CityClerk@longbeach.gov](mailto:CityClerk@longbeach.gov)>  
**Subject:** Comment on Agenda item for City Council meeting

**-EXTERNAL-**

Dear City Clerk Monique de la Garza,

I am writing to you to provide a comment on the agenda published for tomorrow's meeting of City of Long Beach City Council.

My comment is pursuant to item 37.20-0493, *"Recommendation to direct City Clerk to notify all City Departments and advisory bodies that have previously adopted conflict of interest codes, of the biennial review requirements for such conflict of interest codes; and Require all departments and advisory bodies that have previously adopted conflict of interest codes to review such conflict of interest codes and report to the City Council any amendments, or report that no amendments are necessary, no later than October 1, 2020."*

It is clear now that the current mechanisms by which the City of Long Beach attempts to hold the Long Beach Police Department and its officers accountable for both misconduct and the violations of citizens' rights are rife with conflicts of interest, conflicts that are well described in many cases by the examples given in the Ethics Guide for Long Beach City Officials and Employees. Pages 8-11 of the guide itemize examples where conflicts of interest may be problematic, requiring city officials to disqualify oneself from conflicted proceedings.

Pursuant to the agenda item on the reviewing the conflict of interest codes, the City Council should immediately direct actions to eliminate the conflicts of interest that exist when members of the city governance—City Council members as well as the City Manager—are called in to weigh on decisions of police misconduct.

The long historical dependence of membership in the City Council on support from the Long Beach Police Officers Association, and the continued pressure on members of the City Council to ensure that city management remain seen as "pro-police", leads to a direct conflict of interest between police accountability and pro-civil rights leadership by city officials. This extends to the City Council's power in appointing, for example, of favorable City Managers, a position that has the power to overrule the Citizen Police Complaint Commission's findings in investigations of police misconduct. This power of the City Manager—through the position's appointment by the City Council—is therefore corrupted at minimum by the appearance of a conflict of interest, and more likely a very real conflict of interest. Membership on the City Council is strongly dependent on support from the police union; employment as a City Manager depends on keeping the City Council members happy. A City Manager that finds for police misconduct too many times knowingly risks a police union that begins to take its ire out on City Council members.

This, it is imperative that such a review of conflict of interest codes be undertaken and concluded in a way that leaves the Citizen Police Complaint Commission having the final voice in investigations of police misconduct. That the City Manager can overrule the commission is simply a clear violation of the codes prohibiting conflicts of interest.

Thank you for your time. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to reach out.

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and  
Resident of Long Beach