

# ICMA CENTER FOR PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT'S CERTIFICATE PROGRAM

The ICMA Center for Performance Measurement's (CPM) Certificate Program recognizes local governments that have made an exceptional commitment to integrating performance measurement into their management practices.

Two types of certificates are awarded each year:

- The **Certificate of Achievement** recognizes local governments that have collected and reported performance information for at least two years in four or more service areas and demonstrate an ongoing commitment to rigorous verification and public reporting of their performance information.
- The **Certificate of Distinction** recipients have met all criteria for the Certificate of Achievement, collected and reported performance information for at least three years across at least six service areas, integrate performance measurement into their strategic planning and decision-making processes, and promote accountability for service-delivery performance within their staffs.

Additional criteria evaluate staff training, data reporting context, process improvement, and networking. For more information, visit Web site [icma.org/performance](http://icma.org/performance).

This year, CPM recognizes 30 local governments for their dedication to the principles of performance measurement. Congratulations to the 2007 CPM Certificate Program recipients.



RESULTS NETWORKS  
*Center for Performance  
Measurement*

## CERTIFICATE OF DISTINCTION

AUSTIN, TEXAS  
BELLEVUE, WASHINGTON  
CORAL SPRINGS, FLORIDA  
DALLAS, TEXAS  
EUGENE, OREGON  
FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA  
GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA  
HENDERSON, NEVADA  
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA  
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA  
PALM COAST, FLORIDA  
PHOENIX, ARIZONA  
PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VIRGINIA  
RENO, NEVADA  
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA  
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA  
SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA  
STERLING HEIGHTS, MICHIGAN  
UNIVERSITY PLACE, WASHINGTON  
VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON  
WASHOE COUNTY, NEVADA  
WESTMINSTER, COLORADO


## CERTIFICATE OF ACHIEVEMENT

DES MOINES, IOWA  
FISHERS, INDIANA  
LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO  
NORTH LAS VEGAS, NEVADA  
ORLANDO, FLORIDA  
PEORIA, ARIZONA  
SAMMAMISH, WASHINGTON  
TACOMA, WASHINGTON

# Measuring Up 2.0

## Chapter 1

### "Stat"-Happy



**W**hen the first edition of *Measuring Up* (*MU1*) came out, the lead anecdote was all about Long Beach, California, and what a mess it was crimewise. In that chapter it was noted that just about everything bad that could be happening to a police department was happening in Long Beach. Evildoers (the local and regional kind, not the international variety) were running amok, making magnificent headway in the push to make Long Beach unlivable. They were running so amok that between 1983 and 1990 crime in general in Long Beach went up by 30 percent; violent crime doubled.

This rapid slide backward snowballed into an unhappy, unhealthy downward trend in recruiting by the Long Beach Police Department: The job was so little fun, and morale at the department was so famously bad, that the city couldn't even fill all of its budgeted staff positions. Nobody wanted to work in a department that was racking up such a lousy string of statistics on such a painfully consistent basis.

JONATHAN WALTERS

As the numbers got worse in Long Beach, the city council began to consider all manner of radical options, including the panacea that continues to be popular in the public sector today when government is faced with some sort of serious, intractable problem: Contract it out. (For more on this phenomenon, see Chapter 7.) In this case, the notion was to turn the job of law enforcement in Long Beach over to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Hey, if it didn't improve the situation, at least it would allow the city council to blame the county.

In the end, a narrow majority of Long Beach city council members voted against law enforcement by proxy and for fixing the department that they had instead. The foundation for the fix would be to embrace a new trend that had been percolating up in various places all over the country, most notably in New York City. That trend involved a much more sophisticated approach to crime fighting than running around town in a kind of endless tail-chasing exercise where the police were forever trying to deal with crimes *after* they'd occurred, which, timing-wise, isn't particularly helpful to victims.

Instead, Long Beach would begin to fight crime by closely tracking and analyzing crime statistics, patterns, and trends virtually on a daily basis, and it would then begin to deploy resources based on *preventing* crime by dealing with hot spots—an increase of a certain type of offense in a certain part of town at a certain time of day. In New York City, this system was known as “CompStat,” which was short for “computer comparison statistics,” an absurdly clunky way to say “statistical trend tracking.”

Long Beach didn't call its new effort anything “stat” (although “BeachStat” has a nice ring to it). But in essence it was following New York City on the leading edge of a trend that would continue to catch fire—not just in law enforcement but in government generally.

It was the beginning of the stat craze. And if anyone doubts how pervasive a trend it's become, think “IraqStat.” That is, when President George W. Bush said an increase in troops came with a demand that the Iraqi government start meeting specific “benchmarks” for performance and progress, he in essence was saying that the United States

### CrystalBallStat

An interesting trend on the “stat” front is using data not just to analyze what happened, but to predict what *will* happen and try to prevent it. For a while now, cops, for example, have used time and place mapping as a way to set up stakeouts.

But the trend has spilled beyond its obvious applications in law enforcement: The New York City Department of Homeless Services has done an analysis of the neighborhoods in which residents seem most vulnerable to falling into the shelter system. In those neighborhoods, the city is now conducting aggressive outreach through local community service organizations to try to catch people before they fall—they're trying everything from rental assistance to job and marriage counseling. Early evidence is that the preemptive approach to fighting homelessness has promise.

would be looking at data—both practical on-the-ground data and political-progress data—in assessing how open-ended its commitment to the war in Iraq would be. Congress, not incidentally, was demanding the same thing.

Now, there may be those hardened skeptics out there who wonder whether certain high-level, elected officials who bear an amazing resemblance to Alfred E. Neuman (for you youngsters not familiar with the name, Google it and see if you don't agree) are actually capable of responding to real numbers and real news, especially when both are bad.

But we're not going to get bogged down in a discussion of that now. We'll get bogged down in a discussion of that in the last chapter—“Elected Officials: The Weak Link in American Government?” What we will do right now is argue that flying dumb and flying blind are very different things. At least if you've got good data, there is the

potential to use that data in making better decisions. If you don't have data at all, then you're just guessing, and in a lot of areas of public policy the stakes are just too high to rely on guessing.

Which brings us back to Long Beach, which had been guessing wrong for too long when it came to crime fighting. Launching its new stat-based battle plan in the late 1990s, the city did, in fact, begin to turn the crime-fighting tide, to wit: In 2003, Long Beach reported 18,613 serious crimes, including 8,074 larcenies/thefts and 50 murders/incidents of manslaughter. In 2004, those numbers were 18,426, 7,436, and 48, respectively. In 2005, they were 17,014, 6,804, and 42. According to the city's 2006 *Report to the Community*, the rate of violent crime per 1,000 residents was 7.44 in 2003. It rose a fraction in 2004 to 7.7, then dipped to under 7 in 2005.

While this may not seem like much of a decline, keep in mind that the numbers had been trending upward for years. Also keep in mind that the gains occurred at a time when most other cities were witnessing *increases* in crime.

After using a results-based approach to crime fighting, Long Beach really caught the stat bug in 2003, says the city's director of communications, Kathy Parsons. She says a projected \$102 million budget deficit that year focused the minds of elected officials and public managers in ways previously unseen. "There's been an incredible effort citywide to develop business plans for each department and each bureau within that department," says Parsons. As part of that effort, concrete performance measures have been developed for each bureau.

In 2006, Long Beach published its first *Report to the Community*, which included performance highlights from policy areas ranging from economic development to community health and safety. (To check out the report go to [www.longbeach.gov/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=14266](http://www.longbeach.gov/civica/filebank/blobdload.asp?BlobID=14266).)

In taking the stat approach to governance citywide, Long Beach has become part of a rapidly expanding group of governments that have begun to apply it to governance across a host of policy and program areas.